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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK R GEORGE doing business as
FRANK GEORGE AND SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent

)
)

vs

)
)

OREN LIMITED AND ASSOCIATES,
a Utah partnership,

)
)

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Case No. 18359

)

Defendant-Appellant

)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Plaintiff-Respondent petitions the Court for a rehearing in this matter.
The decision of the Court was filed August 29, 1983. In that decision, the
Court erred in the following particulars:
1. The Court's decision recognizes and grants judgment in favor of
the Defendant (i.e. a dismissal of the action) on the basis of
illegality of contract, which affirmative defense must be pleaded.
Defendant waived this "defense" by its failure to plead the same.
See Rules 12(h) and 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The decision assumes, incorrectly and contrary to the evidence adduced
at trial, that the licensing statute afforded "protection" to the
Defendant.
3. The decision misunderstands at least one significant fact which would
otherwise bring the case within existing law so as to allow Plaintiff
his recovery.
4. The decision fails to take into account the fact that the Plaintiff
should be compensated for the value of the materials he "sold" to the
Defendant (i.e. the water and sewer pipes), irrespective of his
unlicensed status which is of importance only to recovery for personal
services rendered in installing said pipes.
11

11

J

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of September, 1983.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------------------------------------FRANK R GEORGE doing business as
FRANK GEORGE AND SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent

)
)

vs

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

)
)

OREN LIMITED AND ASSOCIATES,
a Utah partnership,

)
)

Case No. 18359

)

Defendant-Appellant

)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------POINT I
THE DECISION ASSUMES, INCORRECTLY
AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AT TRIAL, THAT THE LICENSING STATUTE
AFFORDED PROTECTION TO THE DEFENDANT
The Court's decision places great emphasis upon the assumption that
the licensing statute [Section 58-23-1 et seq, Utah Code Annotated] provided
the Defendant with "protection" and thus the Plaintiff should be precluded
from any recovery. This is certainly an incorrect assumption, patently contrary
to the evidence adduced at trial.
First, the "unlicensed" status of the Plaintiff was not even raised until
on the eve of trial. The "defense" was raised only via the general "failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" basis. Plaintiff's Complaint
does state a valid claim---irrespective of the "unlicensed" status; see Point II,
below. This should be contrasted with the requirements of Rule 8(c), which requires·
the Defendant to affirmatively plead the following defenses: failure of consideratio
illegality, license, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
11

defense." ilrhe Defendant's failure to "affinnatively plead" these defenses,
espfttia-lly tne"megaKty 11 defense herein raised, operates as a waiver of
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that defense. See Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Secondly, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that the Department of
Business Regulation had NEVER INSPECTED subdivision work (i.e. the grading of
roads and the installation of water and sewer lines) in Fannington City. See
the testimony of Mr Walter Clock, Fannington City Building Inspector for five
and one-half years. Transcript pp. 92-93.
This second point is particularly significant when one considers the FACT
that the Defendant had the opportunity to present evidence showing that it was
injured. by the Plaintiff. Indeed, the Defendant took that opportunity! Much
testimony was given by the Defendant's agents that the Plaintiff "delayed"
performance of his end of the bargain. THESE CLAIMS WERE PRESENTED TO, BUT
REJECTED BY, THE JURY. No authority is needed for the principle that a verdict,
especially a jury verdict, is, on appeal, analyzed in a light most favorable to
the prevailing party---the Plaintiff.
No evidence was presented by the Defendant to show that the Department of
Business Regulation would have "protected" the Defendant in any particular. I
submit that the Department would not take any action---with respect to the Plaintiff,
had he been licensed---on the basis of the "alleged delay". In fact, by that time,
the damage (that is, alleged "damage") to Defendant had already been co11111itted and
it would be left up to the judicial system (which has the appropriate tools and
skills to resolve the dispute) to handle the matter. Had the Plaintiff been
licensed, the 11 bond 11 he would have been required to post with the Department would
have been so minimimal as to be insignificant when compared against the Defendant's
counterclaim of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS! The licensing statute doesn't
even come closing to providing the Defendant with that kind of "protection".
This is especially true when the Defendant is given opportunity at trial to
assert EVERY DEFENSE IT HAS against payment under the contract. If the workmanship
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were (which, by reason of the jury verdict, the Court must conclude that
it, in fact, was not)

11

faulty 11 in some particular, the Defendant has the

opportunity to show it in trial and avoid payment. Indeed, the Defendant made
such a claim: considerable time was spent presenting evidence concerning
whether the sewer line had a leak at some unknown location. Obviously, the
jury found in favor of the Plaintiff on that issue. But the point really is:
the judicial forum affords the Defendant the "protection" he needs against
faulty workmanship, etc., occurring in the job he has contracted for. The
Defendant's "day in court", with his full panoply of rights (discovery, crossexamination of witnesses, representation by counsel, and lastly: a trial by
jury), is much better "protection" than the licensing statute will ever
afford the Defendant.
On the other hand, the Court's decision "slams the door in the face" of
the Plaintiff on a hypertechnical interpretation of a statute, which, by its
tenns, isn't even applicable here. [The statute specifies that contracting without
a license is a misdemeanor;.a penalty of imprisonment and $299 fine is specified
for its violation. That shows what the Legislature feels about the problem--and that's only after the offender, who is assumed to be innocent, is first
prosecuted and then convicted. Yet the Court, by judicial decision, has now
created a PENALTY TWO HUNDRED TIMES GREATER than the fine the Legislature has
specified. As indicated earlier, the rule in Utah has been that the "law does
not favor a forfeiture, and thus, statutes imposing such are to be strictly
construed." The Court's decision certainly does not adhere to that principle.]
While the Plaintiff's "unlicensed" status for the lengthy period of time is
perhaps not to be encouraged, it is improper for the Court to fashion a decision
which, by operating from an impractical theoretical basis divorced from the
established realities of the situation, "punishes" the Plaintiff and "rewards"
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the Defencfant---who sonta,may say would be guilty of "theft" for having instructed

the Plaintiff to continue with the work, when the Defendant should have known
there would be no money with which to pay the Plaintiff. [Indeed, the Defendant's
agents, some eight months after the work (installation of water and sewer lines)
was

terminated in the fall of 1979, indicated to the Plaintiff to go to Farmington

City to be paid for the work he had done. See Exhibit "K".]
Indeed, the licensing statute has become, in the words of Justice Wilkins
speaking for a unanimous Court in Fillmore Products, "an unwarranted shield for
the avoidance of a just obligation." 561 P.2d at 690. The instant decision--showing little flexibility and almost no recognition for equity and justice--is certainly a significant retreat from the more enlightened approach taken in
'Fillmore Products and Lignell.
The instant decision attempts to distinguish Fillmore Products and Lignell
from the present factual and legal setting. It must be conceded that those two cases
are different; it is highly unlikely that counsel would be able to come up with a
case decision which was "on all fours" with the present situation. [Had there been
such a case, there would have likely been no appeal.] But the fact that there are
differences IGNORES THE PRINCIPLE that it is the similarities which are important:
THE important similarity is the "protection" found by the trial judge and implicitly
recognized by the jury. The fact that there was alternate "protection" for the
Defendant (via the inspections and acceptance of Farmington City) is what is important
in the application of the principles of law from Fillmore Products and Lignell; the
factual differences as to how that protection is established is inconsequential.
On this point, the Court's decision, attempting to analyze the distinctions to
be drawn between the former two cases and the instant situation, IS INCORRECT on a
critical factual issue. The Court states, at p. 6 of the decision, in footnote 9:
It is noted that in the instant case the City's project engineer
designed the improvements to be installed by Plaintiff. The engineer
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did not, however, inspect thw work and does not appear from
the record to have had any responsibility, with respect to
the project, beyond his designing function. In contrast, the
the project engineer in the Fillmore Products case was a
licensed private engineering firm known as Call Engineering,
Inc., which did have an inspection responsibility with respect
to the construction work.
This misunderstanding may have arisen because the parties to the litigation
glossed over the issue because it was not in dispute and was, in essence, a
"given". The project was designed by Jim Byrd of Byrd Engineering; he was
the engineer selected .Qy. the Defendant to do the design and engineering
work for the subdivision. Although the Fannington City engineer (Jim Byrd
IS NOT the City Engineer) had to approve Mr Byrd's drawings and design, before
construction could begin, it was THE DEFENDANT'S ENGINEER which designed the
project. But the "design" is not critical to the "protection" issue, per se,
although it does provide some relevance: the water and sewer lines had to
be installed in only one way---the way shown on the drawings. Those drawings
detailed the required materials and installation. Any variance therefrom by
the contractor would have constituted a breach of the contract, or as a
minimum justified some kind of set-off. Although the Defendant made such a
claim, none was shown; the jury found in Plaintiff's favor. The major emphasis
of the Defendant's claim of breach had to do with "time of performance", rather
than the quality (or lack thereof) of Plaintiff's workmanship.
11

11

Once work was begun, the FARMINGTON CITY inspector took over; he did
the inspections. The "design engineer" (Byrd) had nothing to do with the
project. [See Transcript, p. 16]. This point is significant because Fannington
City---which was going to be the intended future owner of the water lines and
the sewer lines installed by the Plaintiff---did not want to "inherit" [the
"subdivision" approval and development process, as implemented by Utah
municipalities, requires that the developer install, at his expense, these
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improvements, which are then "dedicated" to the municipality] a defective line
which the City would thereafter have to maintain. Thus, the Farmington City
inspector (not the project engineer[Byrd]) made the inspections. Certainly the
City inspector [Mr Clock], acting at the direction and under the supervision of
his employer---Fannington City---which has its own engineer, is going to be just
as careful in inspecting the work as a "licensed private engineering firm" which
made the inspections in Fillmore Products. In fact, the City inspector is going to
actually be "more strict" in adhering to quality because his City is going to have
to live with the problem, if he slips up and allows one to go by. That city inspector
is not going to do that. Thus, the''protection" is present.
The trial judge recognized these facts and accepted this legal principle when
he wrote [which is also quoted on p. 6 of the Court's decision], in part:
. . . and defendant was adequately protected by reason of the
fact that the project had to be tested and approved .Qi: the Fannington
City Engineer.
Emphasis is mine.
The Court should base its decision UPON A CORRECT INTERPETATION OF THE FACTS.
When that is done, it will be recognized that the instant situation comes within
the parameters established by Fillmore Products and Lignell. The trial judge, in
an advantaged position to hear the entire case, recognized such. This Court should
reconsider the factual evidence and should base the decision upon those facts. As
a minimum, page 6 of the Court's decision should be modified so as to correspond to
the true facts.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ALLOWED
TO RECOVER FOR THE VALUE OF THE
"MATERIALS FURNISHED" TO THE
DEFENDANT, REGARDLESS OF HIS
"UNLICENSED" STATUS WHICH SHOULD
PERTAIN ONLY TO RECOVERY FOR THE
"SERVICES RENDERED" IN INSTALLATI
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The Court's decision correctly framed the competing claims of the parties
in this litigation. To quote from page l of the Court's decision:
Plaintiff Frank R. George, dba George & Son Construction,
brought this action to recover sums alleged due for services and
materials provided in the installation of improvements upon
defendant's property, and for a lien against the property so
served. Defendant Oren Limited &Associates counterclaimed for
damages upon a theory that ~laintiff's alleged untimely perfonnance
constituted~ breach of· contract • . . •
Emphasis is mine. Yet the "bottom line" of the Court's decision is that
the Plaintiff is DENIED ANY RECOVERY---ABSOLUTELY, NO QUESTIONS ASKED!! As
such, this result is patently unfair.
Part of his claim for money was FOR THE COST OF THE MATERIALS ACTUALLY
INSTALLED: the pipes for the water and sewer lines
11

11

•

Certainly his "unlicensed" status has no bearing on the fact that he has
delivered to the:·Defendant a valuable product. The licensing statute only
pertains to those who "engage in the business of contracting" (that is, who
agree to do work
11

11
).

It does NOT APPLY to persons who sell PRODUCTS. There is

an obvious reason why the licensing ·statute applies only to 11 contractors 11 : the
Legislature was aware that oftentimes the "workmanship" (being a subjective
issue) was less than desirable. On the other hand, a tangible product (and the
selling of such product) does not require state regulation because it is
more "objective": the buyer can simply look to see what he is getting and
may refuse to purchase it if disatisfied with the quality.
In the instant situation, the Plaintiff is penalized in his "merchant"
capacity merely because he had the misfortune of being unlicensed in his
11

11

"contractor" capacity. There is no equitable reason why the Defendant should
be allowed to retain the product
11

11

(the pipe), merely because an "unclean"

person (that is, the unlicensed contractor) has touched it. The Defendant
simply should not ,be entitled to such a windfall
11

11

;

the Court should act to
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such an unjust enrichment. Certainly the Defendant would not be allowed
to retain possession of the pipe---without paying for the same---if the
Defendant had purchased the pipe from another 11 merchant 11 and then permitted
(i.e. "contracted with") the "unlicensed" Plaintiff to install it!
The Court should allow the Plaintiff to retrieve the water and sewer
lines so installed. [It was these lines for which payment was not made and
suit was brought. For the other improvements, such as the grading work, etc.,
payment was made.] The Court must not think that such a retrieval is not
possible. The 11 subdivision 11 in this case is NOT presently what one nonnally
thinks of when the word 11 subdivision 11 is mentioned: paved streets, sidewalks,
kids riding bikes in the street lined with homes. That is not the present
condition of the subdivision. The subdivision is [probably because of the
11

11

lack of money on the part of the Defendant to continue with the installation
of the improvements] in basically the same condition as it was in when the
Plaintiff pulled off the job" because he wasn't paid: there are NO paved
11

streets; there are NO sidwalks; there are NO homes lining the streets; there
are NO residents dependent upon the water and sewer lines. The subdivision
11

11

is simply a field with a water line and a sewer line running through it.
Retrieval of those pipes can be accomplished. It should be allowed. The
Defendant should not be allowed to retain the pipe merely because the unlicensed
contractor installed them.
CONCLUSION
As a minimum, the Court should amend its decision so as to accurately
reflect and take into account the operative facts. When those facts are
considered, it must be noted that the Defendant had considerably more protection
11

afforded to it by virtue of the Fannington City inspections and acceptance than
would be afforded via licensing with the state agency, which, as shown by
the evidence, has nothing to do with subdivision work. Indeed, the entite
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11

judicial process "protects" the Defendant against faulty or defective
workmanship much more than any assumed protection via the licensing statute.
The Defendant had a plenary opportunity to allege "faulty or defective"
workmanship on the part of the Plaintiff; the jury verdict in favor of the
Plaintiff must be construed to evidence the lack of merit to Defendant's
claims on that issue. Indeed, the only "defense" really vigorously asserted
pertained only to "time of perfonnance", and not "quality". It is highly
suspect to think the licensing statute afforded any "protection" on that
issue, especially in light of the complete judicial proceedings and disposition.
Further, the Defendant has "waived" its right to assert the "illegality"
and these other "defenses" by reason of its failure to affinnatively plead"
11

the same, as required by the Rules.
The Court should not retreat from the enlightened decisions recently-decided
and return to the one adhering to "mechanical application" of techicalities
which operate to frustrate justice and equity. The Defendant received exactly
what it bargained for: a water and sewer line acceptable to Fannington City.
The jury verdict found there was no unreasonable delay. The instant decision,
if not modified, works a tremendous "forfeiture" upon the Plaintiff and exacts
a financial penalty upon him two-hundred fold of that intended by the Legislature,
while at the same time "rewarding" the certainly questionable (criminal? ethical?
moral?) conduct of the Defendant of continuing to have the Plaintiff work when
the Defendant knew there would be no funds for payment. The Court should remedy
this situation. Equity and fairness demands such. The present decision has become
11

an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a just obligation."
In the alternative, the Court should allow the Plaintiff to retrieve the

pipe from the Defendant. The licensing statute was never intended to provide
protection in the "merchant" capacity.
-9-
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The judgment of the trial court, rendered upon the jury verdict received after
two day's trial in which all relevant issues (i.e. defenses: defective and/or untimely
perfonnance justifies non-payment) were raised, should be affinned. The Plaintiff
should be awarded the amount determined by the jury, plus interest, costs and
attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of September, 1983.

CERTIFICATE
I certify that I hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING and
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING to the
office of Mr Lorin N Pace, Attorney for Defendant-Repondent, 136 E. South Temple
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 16th day of September, 1983.
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